the rocks will cry out

Very related to this post, here’s Adam Mastroianni:

[Charles] Spearman was right that people differ in their ability to solve well-defined problems. But he was wrong that well-defined problems are the only kind of problems. “Why can’t I find someone to spend my life with?” “Should I be a dentist or a dancer?” and “How do I get my child to stop crying?” are all important but poorly defined problems. “How can we all get along?” is not a multiple-choice question. Neither is “What do I do when my parents get old?” And getting better at rotating shapes or remembering state capitols is not going to help you solve them.

We all share some blame with Spearman, of course, because everybody talks about smarts as if they’re one thing. Google “smartest people in the world” and most of the results will be physicists, mathematicians, computer scientists, and chess masters. These are all difficult problems, but they are well-defined, and that makes it easy to rank people. The best chess player in the world is the one who can beat everybody else. The best mathematician is the one who can solve the problems that nobody else could solve. That makes it seem like the best chess players and mathematicians are not just the smartest in their fields, but the smartest in the whole world.

It also reminds me of this, from Julian Barnes, which sort of takes it to another level:

I used to believe, when I was ‘just’ a reader, that writers, because they wrote books where truth was found, because they described the world, because they saw into the human heart, because they grasped both the particular and the general and were able to re-create both in free yet structured forms, because they understood, must therefore be more sensitive- also less vain, less selfish- than other people. Then I became a writer, and started meeting other writers, and studied them, and concluded that the only difference between them and other people, the only, single way in which they were better, was that they were better writers. They might indeed be sensitive, perceptive, wise, generalizing and particularizing- but only at their desks and in their books. When they venture out into the world, they regularly behave as if they have left all their comprehension of human behaviour stuck in their typescripts. It’s not just writers either. How wise are philosophers in their private lives?

“Not a whit wiser for being philosophers,” replies my brother. “Worse, in their semi-public lives, far less wise than many other species of academics.” I remember once laying down Bertrand Russel’s autobiography in a moment, not of disbelief, more a kind of appalled belief. This is how he describes the beginning of the end of his first marriage: “I went out bicycling one afternoon, and suddenly, as I was riding along a country road, I realized that I no longer loved Alys. I had no idea until this moment that my love for her was even lessening.” The only logical response to this, to its implications and manner of expression, would be: keep philosophers off bicycles. Or perhaps, keep philosophers out of marriage. Save them for discussing truth with God. I would want Russel on my side for that.

It’s nice to think about the world being divided into smart people and stupid people. But the truth is that anybody—anybody—no matter how intelligent, can be as dumb as a rock.

Nonetheless, the rocks will cry out.

true patriotism

A more complete version of the previous quote from Simone Weil, from a letter to Georges Bernanos:

What you say about nationalism, war, and French foreign policy after the war is equally sympathetic to me. I was ten years old at the time of Versailles, and up to then I had been patriotically thrilled as children are in war-time. But the will to humiliate the defeated enemy which revealed itself so loathsomely everywhere at that time (and in the following years) was enough to cure me once for all of that naive sort of patriotism, I suffer more from the humiliations inflicted by my country than from those inflicted on her.

Related, Vaclav Havel, in his 1990 New Year’s Address to Czechoslovakia:

Self-confidence is not pride. Just the contrary: only a person or a nation that is self-confident, in the best sense of the word, is capable of listening to others, accepting them as equals, forgiving its enemies and regretting its own guilt. Let us try to introduce this kind of self-confidence into the life of our community and, as nations, into our behavior on the international stage. Only thus can we restore our self-respect and our respect for one another as well as the respect of other nations.

the long magnificent defeat

Frederick Buechner:

Jacob is winning. … Then suddenly, all is reversed.

He merely touches the hollow of Jacob’s thigh, and in a moment Jacob is lying there crippled and helpless. The sense we have, which Jacob must have had, that the whole battle was from the beginning fated to end this way, that the stranger had simply held back until now, letting Jacob exert all his strength and almost win so that when he was defeated, he would know that he was truly defeated; so that he would know that not all the shrewdness, will, brute force that he could muster were enough to get this. Jacob will not release his grip, only now it is a grip not of violence but of need, like the grip of a drowning man.

The darkness has faded just enough so that for the first time he can dimly see his opponent’s face. And what he sees is something more terrible than the face of death—the face of love. It is vast and strong, half ruined with suffering and fierce with joy, the face a man flees down all the darkness of his days until at last he cries out, “I will not let you go, unless you bless me!” Not a blessing that he can have now by the strength of his cunning or the force of his will, but a blessing that he can have only as a gift.

Power, success, happiness, as the world knows them, are his who will fight for them hard enough; but peace, love, joy are only from God. And God is the enemy whom Jacob fought there by the river, of course, and whom in one way or another we all of us fight—God, the beloved enemy. Our enemy because, before giving us everything, he demands of us everything; before giving us life, he demands our lives—our selves, our wills, our treasure.

Will we give them, you and I? I do not know. Only remember the last glimpse we have of Jacob, limping home against the great conflagration of the dawn. Remember Jesus of Nazareth, staggering on broken feet out of the tomb toward the resurrection, bearing on his body the proud insignia of the defeat that is victory, the magnificent defeat of the human soul at the hands of God.

refusing to partake

Jonathan Haidt:

We must act with compassion too. The fear and cruelty of the post-Babel era are a result of its tendency to reward public displays of aggression. Social media has put us all in the middle of a Roman coliseum, and many in the audience want to see conflict and blood. But once we realize that we are the gladiators—tricked into combat so that we might generate “content,” “engagement,” and revenue—we can refuse to fight. We can be more understanding toward our fellow citizens, seeing that we are all being driven mad by companies that use largely the same set of psychological tricks. …

The post-Babel world will not be rebuilt by today’s technology companies. That work will be left to citizens who understand the forces that brought us to the verge of self-destruction, and who develop the new habits, virtues, technologies, and shared narratives that will allow us to reap the benefits of living and working together in peace.

gracious spade labeling

From Damon Linker’s (ridiculously) fair treatment of Rod Dreher:

Whereas the return of political hope led most members of the American religious right to express gushing approval of Trump, Rod rose in regular defense of Orbán instead, explaining to a long list of American journalists how unfairly American journalists were treating the Hungarian president. Rod also played a key role in arranging Carlson’s visit to Hungary during the summer of 2021, which led to a week of fawning coverage on Fox News in prime time. CPAC coming to Budapest in May 2022 and Orbán flying to Dallas next week for another appearance at the conference are just the latest testaments to the convergence between the Republican Party and Orbán’s Fidesz Party, which Rod has been helping to foster.

Linker goes on to ask if Christian politics and moral truth are compatible with the racist and xenophobic illiberalism of Viktor Orbán? Of course, being gracious, he calls his friend Rod to admit his mistakes and make the appropriate changes. But when was the last time anyone even heard of someone doing that? These days—if they’re even different days at all—the best you can hope for is that someone might change his or her mind but will pretend he or she never thought differently. Dreher et al have been continuing down the exact same trajectory for years. As Gregory Thomson said about Dreher’s latest book,

it nurses fears of propaganda even as it misrepresents history. Because it invokes liberalism while holding others in contempt. Because it denies the oppression of others while heralding its own victimization. Because it decries therapeutic culture while indulging in self-actualization. Because it affects dissidence while remaining silent before a destructive regime. Because it assumes a Christian identity while failing to embody Christian practice. Because, in sum, Dreher has produced a historically reductive, relationally tribal, intellectually superficial, and profoundly self-absorbed work that actually performs what it protests.

what counts as seeing

Ed Yong, on his book, An Immense World:

There really are a lot of scientists who have sensory divergence, who have things like colorblindness or prosopagnosia, the kinds of things that some people might bill as disorders and that I’m choosing to bill as perceptual differences. These kinds of differences make people a little bit more attuned to the ways in which animals might be different. If you know that the way you perceive the world is atypical, you’re more likely to cue into atypicality in the creatures you are studying.

And a lot of them have arts backgrounds. There are a lot of painters and musicians among people who study vibrations and sounds. And I think that’s valuable too because the problem with thinking about the sensors— which folks like Thomas Nagel and others wrote about—is that it’s an inherently impossible task. We can get some way towards understanding how a bat or a whale or a dog experiences the world, but we’ll never get that entirely. There’s always going to be this chasm where it can only be leapt over through imagination rather than through empiricism. Empiricism can guide our imagination, but we still have to make that final leap on our own. To really get at this, you need to fuse the sciences and the arts. You need to think more broadly than just the products of research papers. And people who are artists have an edge in thinking in this way. They are people who are paid to let their imaginations run riot.

global vulnerability

I recently referenced Jonathan Lear from his book Radical Hope:

Humans are by nature cultural animals: we necessarily inhabit a way of life that is expressed in a culture. But our way of life—whatever it is—is vulnerable in various ways. And we, as participants in that way of life, thereby inherit a vulnerability. Should that way of life break down, that is our problem. …

We live at a time of a heightened sense that civilizations are themselves vulnerable. Events around the world—terrorist attacks, violent social upheavals, and even natural catastrophes—have left us with an uncanny sense of menace. We seem to be aware of a shared vulnerability that we cannot quite name. I suspect that this feeling has provoked the widespread intolerance that we see around us today—from all points on the political spectrum. It [is] as though, without our insistence that our outlook is correct, the outlook itself might collapse. Perhaps if we could give a name to our shared sense of vulnerability, we could find better ways to live with it.

It’s not quite what Lear has in mind, I don’t think, but a name for that vulnerability (though there are certainly many) could be “globalization.” Or at least that’s what Thomas Hylland Eriksen says:

Consumer researchers have often pointed out that consumers are creative and independent, and that apparent standardisation may conceal considerable variation. This is not an irrelevant objection, but it is difficult to deny that the new diversity is qualitatively different from the old. Language death may be an indicator. In the early 2020s, we have about 7,000 languages spoken worldwide. Linguists estimate that 90 per cent of them may be gone in just a few decades. If there is some truth to the assumption that every language produces a unique vision of the world (‘certain ideas can be expressed only in German’, as I was once taught), there is a case for suggesting that the cultural diversity of the world is facing a mass extinction on a par with the reduced complexity of the global biosphere. The world is becoming semiotically poorer. With every extinct language, a unique way of perceiving the world disappears. […]

A major challenge today consists in finding ways of halting this movement away from a world of many differences towards a world of just a few, and defences of biodiversity and cultural diversity are two sides of the same coin. Until now, critics of the negative effects of globalisation have typically focused on inequality, climate change and environmental damage, or the marginalisation of vulnerable groups such as migrants, refugees and Indigenous peoples. It is time now to view the global situation through a lens enabling us to see all the destructive effects of globalisation as threads in the same tapestry. Contemporary globalisation is a bulldozer on speed, razing rainforests, turning tribal peoples into urban slumdwellers, simplifying ecosystems and obliterating traditional livelihoods. The loss of semiotic freedom is creating a poorer world of reduced beauty but, more seriously, it leads to ecological disaster and diminishing options for humanity.

revolution and carpet slippers

Robert Nozick (somewhat ironically out of context—he’s differentiating between “design” and “filter” devices of construction —but I love the thought):

It is helpful to imagine cavemen sitting together to think up what, for all time, will be the best possible society and then setting out to institute it. Do none of the reasons that make you smile at this apply to us?”

James C. Scott (emphasis added):

[T]he legibility of a society provides the capacity for large-scale social engineering, high-modernist ideology provides the desire, the authoritarian state provides the determination to act on that desire, and an incapacitated civil society provides the leveled social terrain on which to build. …

Designed or planned social order is necessarily schematic; it always ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order. This truth is best illustrated in a work-to-rule strike, which turns on the fact that any production process depends on a host of informal practices and improvisations that could never be codified. By merely following the rules meticulously, the workforce can virtually halt production. In the same fashion, the simplified rules animating plans for, say, a city, a village, or a collective farm were inadequate as a set of instructions for creating a functioning social order. The formal scheme was parasitic on informal processes that, alone, it could not create or maintain. To the degree that the formal scheme made no allowance for these processes or actually suppressed them, it failed both its intended beneficiaries and ultimately its designers as well.

Alan Jacobs:

I have said that Auden was deeply influenced by Kierkegaard, but he gradually came to understand that there were some valuable things, necessary things, that Kierkegaard didn’t understand. Late in his life, Auden would write of Kierkegaard that, “like all heretics, conscious or unconscious, he is a monodist, who can hear with particular acuteness one theme in the New Testament — in his case, the theme of suffering and self-sacrifice — but is deaf to its rich polyphony…. The Passion of Christ was to Kierkegaard’s taste, the Nativity and Epiphany were not.” Auden contends that, while Kierkegaard’s consciously held beliefs were scrupulously orthodox, he was “in his sensibility” a Manichee, who felt strongly the evil and degradation of matter, of our bodies. Indeed, Auden wrote in another essay, with pardonable exaggeration, “A planetary visitor might read through the whole of his voluminous works without discovering that human beings are not ghosts but have bodies of flesh and blood.” And to have bodies of flesh and blood is to live in the world of nature’s necessity as well as in the world of history, of existential choice.

We are therefore, Auden came more and more to reflect, compound beings: subject always to natural laws and yet called upon to “assume responsibility for time” by making decisions — decisions whose inevitable consequences are yet another form of necessity. For Auden, this peculiar situation is above all comic: there is something intrinsically funny about our mixed identity, as we try to exercise Divine powers of decision and yet always find our bodies getting in the way. “A sense of humor develops in a society to the degree that its members are simultaneously conscious of being each a unique person and of being all in common subjection to unalterable laws.” And this sense of humor about one’s condition is for Auden absolutely necessary to spiritual health: he may have dreamed in his youth of redeeming the world through his poetic power, or being destroyed in the effort, but as an older man he found himself, as he often remarked, just a “martyr to corns,” which afflicted his feet and made him comfortable only in carpet slippers.

voilà, water isn’t wet

Ted Goia, on the pervasiveness of practitioners of sophistry, “a group that thrives on not calling things by their true names” (a group also known as Pretty Much Everybody Everywhere All the Time):

We need to go back to the ancient Greeks to come up with a working definition of sophistry. And as soon as I start describing it, you will nod your head in agreement. You will realize that sophistry reallymust be word of the year—because it’s even more popular than binge-watching and selfie sticks put together.

And it’s not surprising that sophists should be so active nowadays. The history of sophistry reveals that it is closely aligned with the rise of democracy, especially unruly and disordered democracy. Thus the Sophists exerted enormous influence in ancient Greece during the late fifth century BC, when they played decisive roles in many settings, especially legal proceedings and political gatherings.

Below is a definition of the sophist, drawn mostly from Plato and Aristotle—who feared the tremendous influence of these public figures.

  • The sophists, unlike philosophers, do not pursue the truth, but only master the art of persuasion.
  • In a very real sense, talking is their vocation, although you might guess otherwise from their rhetoric, which invariably promises more than any sophist will ever deliver.
  • Despite the shallowness of their thinking, sophists have far more influence than honest and serious thinkers, especially in matters of politics and policy. This is because the sophist’s rhetoric is always shaped by what their audience wants to hear.
  • For that same reason, sophists will avoid painful truths that run counter to popular demand. Addressing hard truths is bad for their business.
  • Sophists are frequently deceivers and sometimes outright charlatans, whose goal is to make people believe whatever they want—and thus, according to Plato and Aristotle, they are responsible for a large portion of the public holding false beliefs.
  • If necessary, a sophist can actually argue both sides of any issue—and thus has the skill to make the bad seem good, or evil look like justice.
  • They are often aligned with the rich and powerful, and have a knack for making money from their abilities.
  • In the words of one classicist, the end result is a powerful group of influencers (as we would call them today) who are “crudely self-serving” and “frivolously manipulative.”
  • Yet the sophists remain popular despite all these obvious warning signs. That’s no coincidence, because the sophists practice a vocation that deliberately aims at enriching and empowering the possessor of sophistical skills. […]

I remember someone advising me on social media to avoid engaging a certain person in dialogue. My friend told me: “Beware of [name omitted], because once he gets started he will insist that water isn’t wet.”

I laughed at that description. Can you really do that? Hey, once you learn a few sophistic rules, it’s easy.

Stop acting like a dimwit, Ted. You certainly know that at certain temperatures, water achieves a solidity in which all moisture is absent. So when you claim that water is wet, you’re the one who’s all wet. Conversely, at higher temperatures, the water enters a gaseous state. So if you persist in denying that, Ted, you’re full of gas yourself. Etc. etc. etc.

Voilá—water isn’t wet.

You’re nodding your heads again. So you’ve met people like that too?

Of course you have. They’re everywhere. They take showers in the morning and don’t even need to towel off, because their water isn’t wet.

In all fairness to my critics, I don’t think they were deliberately trying to mislead. The fact that they were practicing these rhetorical tricks—which we call sophistry—was simply due to the fact that this is how all disagreements are handled nowadays.

I fear it’s so pervasive that no sphere of society is unaffected. Even married couples probably practice sophistry in their household arguments.

And this is sad, because this style of discourse makes everyone angrier and angrier. No one likes criticism, but how much worse when the attacks aren’t even focused on reality, but rely on the most blatant manipulation of words?

At that juncture, genuine communication becomes impossible. I’m not even referring to finding agreement or reaching a compromise—which don’t even figure as goals anymore. Just having an honest dialogue has disappeared, because both parties prefer a sophistic monologue.