“burn it down”

Re-upping from here:

I get that both sides of the political isle—as a whole!—do a wonderful job of maintaining a mutually despising feedback loop. And I’m not saying that the Left—religious or not, non-white or otherwise—hasn’t earned a great deal of scorn. But as far as I can see, the Right, especially in its religious elements, has earned every last drop of its closed-minded, dishonest, immoral, unintelligent, and lazy reputation. Its house is entirely corrupt, and that is no one’s fault but that of its own members.

And also here:

There has probably never been a time when parties were not cult-afflicted. The current Democratic Party is no exception. But the Republican Party at this point is pure cult-of-personality, cult-of-grievance. Its insanity and stupidity can not possibly be overstated.

To agree with Andrew Sullivan here:

I am not saying that the Democrats are not also corrupted by rank tribalism. At their worst, they are, as I often point out. I am saying that they do not compare with the current GOP in its hollowness and depravity and madness.

[Herschel] Walker shows that there is no principle they will not jettison, no evil they will not excuse, no crime they won’t “whatabout,” and no moron they won’t elect, if it means they gain power. There is degeneracy among many Democrats, sure. But the Republican party is defined by this putrescence. Burn it down.

sweet sweet diversions

Alan Jacobs:

It turns out that reality has limited power over an infinitely distractible and distracted society.

Blaise Pascal:

– 171. Misery. The only thing which consoles us for our miseries is diversion, and yet this is the greatest of our miseries. For it is this which principally hinders us from reflecting upon ourselves, and which makes us insensibly ruin ourselves… Without diversions, we should be in a state of weariness, and this weariness would spur us to seek a more solid means of escaping from it. But diversion amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death.

a cynic’s take on orthodoxy

I highlighted this from David French’s The Third Rail newsletter last week:

I can name many people who know who Jesus is and embody those virtues as well as imperfect people can.

But when the Church leads with its moral code—and elevates that moral code over even the most basic understandings of Jesus Christ himself—the effect isn’t humility and hope; it’s pride and division. When the Church chooses a particular sin as its defining apostasy (why sex more than racism, or greed, or gluttony, or cruelty?), it perversely lowers the standards of holy living by narrowing the Christian moral vision.

The result is a weaker religion, one that is less demanding for the believer while granting those who uphold the narrow moral code a sense of unjustified pride. Yet pride separates Christians from each other, and separates Christians from their neighbors.

Millions of Christians are humble and hopeful. Millions are also prideful and divisive. Why? One answer is found in the LifeWay-Ligonier survey. In the quest for morality, they’ve lost sight of Jesus—but it is Jesus who truly defines the Christian faith.

Along with Alan Jacobs and I’m sure many others, I say a hearty “yes and amen!”

Buuut…

It’s fitting that Jacobs decided to quote French and the survey on his blog, since Jacobs is the first person I thought of when I read it.

Maybe this is a stretch, but I would be very curious to see Jacobs do something similar with the data from the Lifeway-Ligonier survey as he has done with the romanticized ideas of lost literacy and readership. He says, in nuce, that we don’t know enough about the history of literacy at any given point in any given society to make any meaningful comparisons, and therefore there is no point in making comparative judgments between us and our ancestors. And, perhaps even more relevantly, he adds another point:

I will just say this: I think the hidden assumption in essays like Harrington’s and Garfinkle’s [on the subject of Literacy Lost] is that if people weren’t on social media and staring at their iPhones they’d be reading books instead. And I don’t believe for one second that that’s a safe assumption.

Again, it might be a stretch, but I think that very similar questions can be asked, and criticisms made, of this new survey on “orthodoxy.” Maybe there are other studies to compare here, but I would very much like to know: When exactly in the past did we, as Christians (self-identified or otherwise), have a clear grasp on orthodoxy?

That seems like a question worth asking. But the main point I would like to make is this: I would not be the least bit surprised if there is absolutely no significant correlation between “orthodoxy” and genuine Christlike conduct.

A few years ago, while I was finishing my bachelor’s degree, I took a history class called “Genocide in Our Time.” One of the assignments each week was to respond to a given question in our own journal-essays. One week’s question was on the topic of “raising awareness” and its effectiveness.

I don’t remember the exact question that was asked, but here is my response, titled “A Cynic’s Take on Awarenesss”:

I’m no scholar of the Protestant Reformation, but I grew up being taught that the reformers believed in three distinct but related elements of conversion: notitia, assensus, and fiducia. A person could hear all the details (notitia) and agree that they are true (assensus), but it was not until people actually placed their confidence in that truth—had “cast themselves upon it”—that they could be said to have faith (fiducia). I’ve never heard them used outside of the Reformation, but those three little Latin words seem to me to have significance far beyond the ecclesia.

I mentioned in the discussion this week that I’m a bit of a cynic when it comes to the topic of “raising awareness.” If I was being truly honest (and more willing to risk offense) I would have said that “raising awareness” is almost an entirely meaningless phrase to me. Even now I’m a little hesitant to admit this, partly because I’m afraid that what someone will hear is that I am somehow against truth or justice, or that anyone who operates under the task of raising awareness is doing meaningless work. This is certainly not what I mean. I think one way to say what I mean is this: in the same way that the reformers believed that notitia and assensus were nothing if they did not include the commitment of fiducia, hearing the details about genocide and believing them to be true are (almost) meaningless acts if they do not include the “faithfulness” required to prevent or respond to them. That in no way means that awareness doesn’t matter. Sticking with the analogy: if raising awareness amounts more or less to the notitia and assensus of the truth of genocide, someone need not fear that I’m in any way calling that task meaningless, since the reformers also believed that one couldn’t have fiducia without first having the awareness.

Here, however, just when I think I’m starting to clarify myself, is where I make a slight turn.

In some ways I’m not entirely faithful to my reformed roots. Without getting into too many of the details, I am (these days) inclined to reverse the above formulation—much to the chagrin of my own father, Reformation man that he is. Though it seems at times very counterintuitive, I think that fiducia almost always comes first, and that you can have it without—strictly speaking—having the other two. Put simply: if one doesn’t have the character of commitment (fiducia), then notitia and assensus won’t really matter. Character is infinitely more important than any amount of knowledge or awareness. T.S. Eliot asked, “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? / Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?” Somehow we have learned—though this is not a new problem—to speak about the truth without becoming wise. Or, more to the point, we often act as though getting all the facts straight will somehow make us wise, but ages upon ages of humanity tell us that this is simply not true.

I believe as much as anyone in the importance of calling a thing by its true name, especially when it comes to genocide, but the question is not so much about how we can get more people to admit of atrocities or to acknowledge the word “genocide.” Instead we would do better to ask how we might, each and all, be and become a people who are, in the words of Albert Camus, “resolved to speak out clearly and to pay up personally.” Forget those who consider themselves “aware.” Give me ten men and women who know nothing about the history of genocide but who live truthfully and sacrificially today, and I think it will be those faithful (fiducia-filled) people who prevent the next genocide long before anyone else. A people who live in this way will know what to do with the truth when they find it. For those who do not, the truth may not matter at all. As Norton Juster’s character Canby laments in Phantom Tollbooth, “You can swim all day in the sea of knowledge and still come out completely dry. Most people do.”

As mentioned before, I am not saying that spreading the truth about genocide awareness is unimportant; indeed, I think it is massively important. But no matter how important it is, I do think that the truth about genocide at least can be meaningless. We must speak the truth, but if we don’t do more than that, all the awareness in the world will not help the Rohingyas of today or the Yazidis of tomorrow. And in that way, unless some sense of fiducia is central, no awareness project will be, in any meaningful sense, successful.

While in this case I was borrowing an idea to answer a question about genocide prevention, I think, for obvious reasons, that every single word I wrote in that short essay could be said about “orthodoxy” among the “faithful.” In fact, it seems to me that this is one of the core elements that make up the stories and teachings of the Bible, and particularly every encounter with Jesus: Your ability to pass the test—on sexual morality or on theology—is irrelevant.

Again, there could be some more informative data out there that I’m not aware of, so I say this as humbly as possible. Maybe there was a time, in the near or distant past, when a majority of proclaiming Christians had there theological i’s and t’s dotted and crossed and italicized. And maybe these orthodox practitioners were the ones most likely to be sacrificing life and limb for the glory of God and the love of neighbor. But I don’t believe for one second that that’s a safe assumption.

a modern David

David Bentley Hart (2011):

How then, I asked Ambrose, should one portray the prince of darkness? 

After a pensive moment, Ambrose replied, “A merciless real estate developer whose largest projects are all casinos.” 

And recalling this exchange brought Donald Trump to mind. You know the fellow: developer, speculator, television personality, hotelier, political dilettante, conspiracy theorist, and grand croupier—the one with that canopy of hennaed hair jutting out over his eyes like a shelf of limestone.

In particular, I recalled how, back in 1993, when Trump decided he wanted to build special limousine parking lots around his Atlantic City casino and hotel, he had used all his influence to get the state of New Jersey to steal the home of an elderly widow named Vera Coking by declaring “eminent domain” over her property, as well as over a nearby pawn shop and a small family-run Italian restaurant. 

She had declined to sell, having lived there for thirty-five years. Moreover, the state offered her only one-fourth what she had been offered for the same house some years before, and Trump could then buy it at a bargain rate. The affair involved the poor woman in an exhausting legal battle, which, happily, she won, with the assistance of the Institute for Justice. 

How obvious it seems to me now. Cold, grasping, bleak, graceless, and dull; unctuous, sleek, pitiless, and crass; a pallid vulgarian floating through life on clouds of acrid cologne and trailed by a vanguard of fawning divorce lawyers, the devil is probably eerily similar to Donald Trump—though perhaps just a little nicer.


Addendum, 24 February 2025:

I went to add a hyperlink to this post today and found that the link to the First Things article was no longer valid. Then I found that the article was no longer on First Things at all. I checked DBH’s Substack and not only found my suspicion confirmed but discovered that DBH, having reposted the article there, also had an opinion about it:

I have received a number of requests recently that I repost this article from 2011, written long before anyone could foresee the electoral horrors then in store for the country formerly known as the United States of America. It originally appeared in a journal with which I had a professional if not always cordial association; but, recently, readers who have gone in search of it on that journal’s site have found that it has been expunged from the record. I am not wounded. No doubt it is all in keeping with a wholly understandable and blameless desire on the part of the editors to grovel, whine, pant, and slobber in positively orgiastic submission at the feet of the loathsome imbecile to whom the article’s title referred, and in service to whom they have so eagerly betrayed their professed faiths. It may profit a man little to gain the world and lose his soul, but that is still enough profit for some, and who am I to criticize good, honest, enterprising moral cowardice? Back then, they may have grasped that DJT is a cut-rate Satan, but now he’s their cut-rate Satan and so naturally they adore him. Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point. At least, that would be my charitable reading of the situation. (Do I sound bitter?)

Not that it was an especially brilliant article, but it was prompted by a strange premonition whose ultimate accuracy has now been incandescently confirmed.

hand grenade politics

Nick Catoggio:

Strongmen whose power depends on perceptions of invincibility would rather destroy a system that threatens their power than yield for the common good. We saw an example of that in our own country on January 6. We’re seeing a higher-stakes example of it now in Ukraine. No one bets on a monkey with a hand grenade to behave responsibly. But just how irresponsibly it might behave when it’s threatened and desperate to save face, which is all this war is about anymore, is an imponderable we should all start pondering.

prevenient courage

Nadezhda Mandelstam:

M. set the highest value on friendship among “men” with its “handshake at moments of danger,” “battle,” competition for women, common language, and shared jokes. The idea of “battle,” as I have already said, struck me as comic, but he was preparing for it in earnest. In our life, civic courage is a much rarer thing than military valor. People distinguished by utter cowardice in public life could prove to be brave officers or soldiers. How is this possible? The reason is, no doubt, that at the front they were under discipline and simply carried out orders. This was not “battle,” but doing one’s duty, which require not courage, but only stamina and submission to discipline rather than to a moral imperative. Indeed, a man who has lost his personality often regains a sense of his worth as a soldier, during a war. In this country he remains under discipline in peacetime as well, continuing to obey orders even if they run counter to his ideas of honor and duty (how many people still know what these are?). Dreadful as it may seem, the Second World War brought inward relief to some people, because it put an end to the divided feelings so characteristic of peacetime. M. did not survive until the outbreak of war, and in his moment of danger there was not one “man” ready to shake him by the hand. There was, however, a woman to mourn him: Akhmatova, the last person he thought of as a member of his circle. Her farewell kiss meant much more than anything the puny “men” of our era would have been capable of.

Marilynne Robinson:

Courage seems to me to be dependent on cultural definition. By this I do not mean only that it is a word that blesses different behaviors in different cultures, though that is clearly true. I mean also, and more importantly, that courage is rarely expressed except where there is sufficient consensus to support it. Theologians used to write about a prevenient grace, which enables the soul to accept grace itself. Perhaps there must also be a prevenient courage to nerve one to be brave. It is we human beings who give one another permission to show courage, or, more typically, withhold such permission. We also internalize prohibitions, enforcing them on ourselves — prohibitions against, for example, expressing an honest doubt, or entertaining one. This ought not to be true in a civilization like ours, historically committed to valuing individual conscience and free expression. But it is.

Physical courage is remarkably widespread in this population. There seem always to be firefighters to deal with the most appalling conflagrations and doctors to deal with the most novel and alarming illnesses. It is by no means to undervalue courage of this kind to say it is perhaps expedited by being universally recognized as courage. Those who act on it can recognize the impulse and act confidently, even at the greatest risk to themselves. 

Moral and intellectual courage are not in nearly so flourishing a state, even though the risks they entail — financial or professional disadvantage, ridicule, ostracism — are comparatively minor. I propose that these forms of courage suffer from the disadvantage of requiring new definitions continually, which must be generated out of individual perception and judgment. They threaten or violate loyalty, group identity, the sense of comme il faut. They are, intrinsically, outside the range of consensus.

the necessity of mixed feelings

The world needs mixed feelings about its politics and its politicians. For instance, I find it not one bit difficult to hold both of these views fully and simultaneous:

Patrick Chovanec:

No, I am not happy with Biden lumping pro-life people with MAGA. Unfortunately, a lot of pro-lifers have done this themselves. Still, it frustrates me when [Democrats] can’t distinguish between issues Americans have been divided on for a long time [and] the GOP’s dangerous new direction.

The question isn’t whether there is a large overlap between pro-lifers and pro-Trumpers – there clearly is. The question is whether holding this position is one of the things that makes pro-Trumpers a “threat to the Republic”.

Biden has come very close to implying it is, and I think that includes a lot of people… who have no truck with what happened on 1/6, and actually helped prevent it from succeeding.

Americans are going to disagree fiercely about many issues for years to come. It is important to distinguish between this and the rising flirtation with authoritarian populism.

Andrew Sullivan:

And yes, two cheers for Biden. I need to say this more. With some luck but also persistent, quiet outreach to Europe and tight military collaboration with Ukraine, he has a significant foreign policy coup shaping up. His open sharing of US intelligence has kept Russia off-balance; his balanced arming of Ukraine has prevented the war from spiraling out of control; his marshaling of NATO has been superb.

philoxenia

Diana Butler Bass:

From what historians can gather, hospitality — not martyrdom — served as the main motivator for conversions. And early Christians found both spiritual and social power in such acts, for creating inclusive community, a community of radical welcome and love, can put one at odds with ungodly authorities. “It is our care of the helpless, our practice of loving kindness that brands us in the eyes of our many opponents,” claimed the African theologian Tertullian, “’Only look,’ they say, ‘look how they love one another!’” 

Would that every faith community was like a swarm of bees, running out to meet the displaced, the lost, and the unexpected strangers with the same delight, zeal, and alacrity as the earliest Christians. Theologian Letty Russell once noted, “The word for hospitality in the Greek New Testament is philoxenia, love of the stranger. Its opposite is xenophobia, hatred of the stranger.” Philoxenia turns strangers into friends.

bella horrida bella

Daniel Mendelsohn:

As recently as the early twentieth century, the Aeneid was embraced as a justification of the Roman—and, by extension, any—empire: “a classic vindication of the European world-order,” as one scholar put it. (This position is known among classicists as the “optimistic” interpretation.) The marmoreal perfections of its verse seemed to reflect the grand façades of the Roman state itself: Augustus boasted that he found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble.

But in the second half of the last century more and more [“pessimistic”] scholars came to see some of the epic’s most wrenching episodes as attempts to draw attention to the toll that the exercise of imperium inevitably takes. […]

But perhaps we don’t need a translation to drag the Aeneid into the modern era. Maybe it’s always been here, and we’re just looking at it from the wrong angle—or looking for the wrong things. Maybe the inconsistencies in the hero and his poem that have distressed readers and critics—the certainties alternating with doubt, the sudden careening from coolness to high emotion, the poet’s admiring embrace of an empire whose moral offenses he can’t help cataloguing, the optimistic portrait of a great nation rising haunted by a cynical appraisal of Realpolitik at work—aren’t problems of interpretation that we have to solve but, rather, the qualities in which this work’s modernity resides.

This, at any rate, is what was going through my mind one day fifteen years ago, when, I like to think, I finally began to understand the Aeneid. At the time, I was working on a book about the Holocaust, and had spent several years interviewing the few remaining survivors from a small Polish town whose Jewish population had been obliterated by what you could legitimately call an exercise of imperium. As I pressed these elderly people for their memories, I was struck by the similarities in the way they talked: a kind of resigned fatalism, a forlorn acknowledgment that the world they were trying to describe was, in the end, impossible to evoke; strange swings between an almost abnormal detachment when describing unspeakable atrocities and sudden eruptions of ungovernable rage and grief triggered by the most trivial memory.

Months later, when I was back home teaching Greek and Roman classics again, it occurred to me that the difficulties we have with Aeneas and his epic cease to be difficulties once you think of him not as a hero but as a type we’re all too familiar with: a survivor, a person so fractured by the horrors of the past that he can hold himself together only by an unnatural effort of will, someone who has so little of his history left that the only thing that gets him through the present is a numbed sense of duty to a barely discernible future that can justify every kind of deprivation. It would be hard to think of a more modern figure.

Or, indeed, a more modern story. What is the Aeneid about? It is about a tiny band of outcasts, the survivors of a terrible persecution. It is about how these survivors—clinging to a divine assurance that an unknown and faraway land will become their new home—arduously cross the seas, determined to refashion themselves as a new people, a nation of victors rather than victims. It is about how, when they finally get there, they find their new homeland inhabited by locals who have no intention of making way for them. It is about how this geopolitical tragedy generates new wars, wars that will, in turn, trigger further conflicts: bella horrida bella. It is about how such conflicts leave those involved in them morally unrecognizable, even to themselves. This is a story that both the Old and the New Worlds know too well; and Virgil was the first to tell it. Whatever it meant in the past, and however it discomfits the present, the Aeneid has, alas, always anticipated the future.

“not of reciprocity but of nested dependencies”

Leah Libresco Sargeant, in a wonderfully written tribute to, and call for support for, “caring work”:

In [Eva Feder] Kittay’s view, care is never a private matter, something that can be contained in a single dyad or family. Dependency creates a chain of need, which extends out into the wider world. She takes the relationship of mother and child as paradigmatic: “The relation between a needy child and the mother who tends to those needs is analogous to the mother’s own neediness and those who are in a position to meet those needs.” Caring for a child makes the mother more dependent, and gives her a just claim on others, just as the baby has a claim on her.

Kittay terms this framework doulia. She adapts doulia from doula, a person who offers care to a laboring mother. In her broader term, she encompasses “a concept of interdependence that recognizes a relation — not precisely of reciprocity but of nested dependencies — linking those who help and those who require help to give aid to those who cannot help themselves.”

Governmental support can be a response to the claims of doulia. A public, universal benefit recognizes that need is universal and that it does not obey a law of reciprocity. A baby cannot pay back the time and attention he needs from his mother; a mother does not need to earn or recompense the care she receives from others. Instead of clean-cut transactions, there is a circulatory system of care and need, where each gives to the one they can, and receives from the person who cares for them, without concern for balancing the books.

This is the spendthrift logic of the communion of the saints, who know that “whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me” (Matt 25:40). It is the action of the woman with the alabaster jar, who pours out perfumed oil over the feet of the Lord without calculation. But the economy of grace, drawing on the inexhaustible power and love of God, doesn’t map neatly into the economy of appropriations, bills, and state-run welfare programs. […]

[The current Medicaid] framework of careworker compensation sees payment through a market lens — what would it cost to change someone’s mind about providing care? What does it cost to get them to sell their services to this particular client? The programs are worried about fraud, auditing timesheets, requiring licensing and certifications. These programs are built as though the primary risk is giving money to someone who may not have earned it.

But, in Kittay’s model of doulia, the reason for payment isn’t to persuade a caregiver to provide care. It is to enable them to offer the care they frequently already wish to provide. Compensation is often framed as wiping out altruism. If money changes hands, then the caring doesn’t count the same way it would if it were offered for free, or even at considerable cost.

In his prayer for generosity, St. Ignatius of Loyola asks the Lord to teach him, “to give and not to count the cost; to fight and not to heed the wounds; to toil, and not to seek for rest; to labor, and not to ask for reward.” The labor of uncompensated caregivers, caregivers who are strained past exhaustion, who are consumed and eaten up by their work, can sound like the fruit of this prayer. But St. Ignatius concludes his prayer by specifying the one reward he hopes for, “to know that I am doing your will.”

Although it is admirable when someone makes tremendous sacrifices to care for others, there is always something tragic about it, too. We see the saintly person at the center of the story, disregarding their own needs for the sake of another, but, at the peripheries of the story, there are others passing by, like the priest and the Levite who hurry by the man left broken and bleeding on the side of the road. The Catholic Church recognizes certain lives as embodying “white martyrdom” — the laying down of one’s life not in a single moment of death, but denial of self through poverty or celibacy. The martyr’s witness is always a testimony to God’s goodness, but, as with the “red martyrdom” of those killed for the faith, the actions of the person demanding the sacrifice can be wicked. It is good to serve the poor, it is sinful to impoverish. It is not God’s will for anyone to be neglected or left for dead, whether they are the initial victim of misfortune or someone who, in giving all they have, is newly vulnerable as a result.

We are not called to stand by and admire the white martyrdom of hard charities. We are called to answer need with our own gifts. But too often, our systems of care work presume that they can wring more and more work out of the families of the vulnerable, trusting that they will sacrifice themselves if we hold back our own help.

Sargeant goes on to tell the story of Tina, a 40-year-old teacher who was essentially required by her hospital and insurance company to coordinate the care for her brother with leukemia after his bone marrow transplant—even if she had to quit her job to do it. “Her work was admirable,” Sargeant writes, “as was that of her friends and relatives, but it is hollow to praise her without condemning the hard-hearted system that handed her this cross to carry, and then abandoned her.”

Here’s how she closes:

There is no sacrifice we make out of love for another that God disdains. But when we leave caregivers and their charges without support, we are like the Pharisees, who, Jesus says, “tie up heavy, cumbersome loads and put them on other people’s shoulders, but they themselves are not willing to lift a finger to move them” (Matt 23:4). From the beginning of the Church, the martyrs gave testimony of the depth of their love for God in their willingness to die rather than to renounce Him. We benefit from their witness, but we have no reason to be grateful to their persecutors. Paul addresses this question in his letter to the Romans, “Shall we go on sinning so that grace may increase? By no means!” (Rom 6:1-2).

Persecution can make visible the love that might have otherwise expressed itself in more hidden ways, but we must learn to see the quiet virtues, rather than rely on sin and suffering to expose these loves to light. In answering the needs of caregivers, in living out Kittay’s vision of doulia, we respond rightly to others’ willingness to become lowly out of love. We honor the willingness to suffer by not demanding sacrifice. Love answers love, and our strengths are given to us only that we might be good stewards in spending them.