The point was not to avoid the “question of truth” but rather to distinguish it from the “question of interpretation,” the better to answer the latter properly, thereby improving one’s chances of understanding whatever theological truth-claims one wishes to make.
19. What [Hans] Frei does intend to avoid, however, is the task of supplying systematic justification of his position, especially if that means adopting a language alien to scripture as the ultimate source of epistemic authority. Frei is convinced that truth-claims, for example, about the identity of Jesus Christ, are essential to Christian theology rightly understood, and as a Christian theologian he is perfectly prepared to make them. But systematically justifying such truth-claims, in the sense of offering compelling reasons within some other language … for accepting the vocabulary and ontology one would presuppose in using scripture, is: (a) in all likelihood impossible, (b) in tension with characteristically Christian conceptions of faith, and (c) obviously antithetical to Anselmian theology*. One cannot defend Anselmian theology by such means without falling into contradiction. So Frei does not try. This does not make him an irrationalist, for he can still claim that he is justified in accepting the truth-claims he makes as a Christian, and he can still engage in a kind of reasoned argument against his opponents. Being justified in believing something and being able to justify it to someone else, especially in a language of that person’s choosing, are not the same thing. And it is possible to make reasonable arguments against one’s opponents by restricting oneself to ad hoc apologetics, exhibiting what [David H.] Kelsey calls “the partial inadequacy of the available alternatives” and showing that the Anselmian program can succeed on its own terms.
*Stout describes “Anselmiam theology” under the motto “faith seeking understand”: “The understanding they [Anselmian theologians] seek is, as they see it, wholly achievable within scripture but not wholly exhausted by the know-how involved in using scripture in such activities as prayer, worship, preaching, and practical deliberation within the community. The central task of theology, on this view, is precisely to elucidate the use of scripture by describing, more or less as an ethnographer would, the characteristic patterns of attitude-acquisition, inference, and action scripture makes possible. As reflexive ethnographers, such theologians are not condemned merely to repeat sentences from the scripture or liturgy of the Christian community, but neither are they engaged in an effort to translate scripture into a linguistic framework alien to it. Rather, convinced that scripture is not a static system, they are fully prepared to develop conceptual resources within scripture that will assist in the task of Christian self-description. Because they stand fully and self-consciously within scripture, according to it whatever privileged status it implicitly or explicitly claims for itself, they are hesitant to treat any other language as its equal in conversation, let alone as a privileged source of intelligibility and truth.”
Personally, I like this a lot. But I definitely bounce between it and the “Dialogical method” which, according to Stout, “seeks to correlate scripture with the languages of our own age, though without according either side of the correlation privileged status and without supposing that it will be possible to arrive at an integrated theory for determining such matters. The Dialogical theologian moves back and forth between scripture and other languages, hoping to bring them into deeper and more meaningful conversation, all the while treating them (in Frei’s words) as ‘heterogenous equals.’ He or she may introduce theory or utter hermeneutical generalizations, so long as such remarks do not themselves take on the character of a privileged language. ‘Theory’ and ‘hermeneutics’ here remain parasitical upon the process of conversation itself. They are merely the conversation in its moments of reflective self-inventory. They do not replace it with a free-standing linguistic system into which the conversation must be translated in order to be meaningful.”
