We have to avoid two unsatisfactory notions of what philosophical poetry could be. [Simon] Jarvis’ reflections on the possible relations of poetry to philosophy take us beyond the choice between (1) seeing poetry as a potentially decorative and pleasing presentation of a philosophical doctrine already elaborated elsewhere, on one hand, and (2) elevating it to the status of a direct route to philosophic truth, independent of ratiocination and argument, on the other. (1) denies that poetry can be a source of deep insight; (2) fails to see that it convinces through the force of the experience of connection, which is very different from conviction gained through the force of argument. This means that by its very nature, poetic insight will often be incomplete, tentative, and enigmatic (which is not to say that philosophical argument, which aims at clarity and certainty, will not frequently fail to encompass these in its own way); but it also means that serious philosophy cannot afford to ignore poetic insight.
The orders invoked in the subtler languages of the last centuries do indeed make claims, but they are of another kind, and on another basis than the older doctrines of cosmic order. Compared to these the new invoked orders seem incomplete, lacking explicitness, tentative, or provisional. But in the new predicament, where direct, exact, nonsymbolic or nonmythical mirroring of the order is ruled out, and we can only create “translations,” the old kind of completeness and explicitness is unattainable.
That reduction to symbolic mirroring immediately recalls Robert Bly: “we need to notice that our visual imagination becomes confused when we can no longer see the physical king. Wiping out kings severely damages the mythological imagination. Each person has to repair that imagination on his or her own.” (Not surprising that Taylor shows up there too.)