We do not speak enough of virtues and the merits of character in and of themselves, but the U.S. legal code—it too the work of fallible men—does contain helpful language here. Consider the concept of moral turpitude, generally defined as follows:
An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.
The definition is deliberately vague, as intent is part of it. But the general idea involves community, relationships, and ultimately citizenship, making it political in nature.
That word ‘but’ seems out of place to me. I think it could read, “The definition is deliberately vague, as intent is part of it. This is because the general idea involves community, relationships, and ultimately citizenship, making it political in nature.”
Williams continues:
What kind of person behaves in a way that disrespects “the customary rule of right and duty between man and man”? In other words, what kind of man (or woman) behaves in such a selfish manner, abdicating all responsibility to the good of others and the state, as to disrespect his own role to society? The definition acknowledges that we are not our own, we did not make ourselves, and we do not live as islands or masters of our own tiny universe. Indeed, in a flourishing state, our own well-being is contingent on that of others, and so, good and moral citizenship involves respecting our duties to others. The existence of the category of crimes of moral turpitude, one could say, acknowledges the necessity of a well-ordered anthropology in a society. How we think of ourselves vis-à-vis others matters.