The wheel has turned once again. The United States no longer enjoys the vast lead in precision strike capabilities that it once did. The technology underlying those capacities—conventional munitions, sensors, and guidance systems—has become cheaper over time and accessible to many countries and militant groups beyond the United States. From Azerbaijan to North Korea, other forces can strike some targets with the precision, power, and range that were once the preserve of the U.S. military. They have benefited from advances made in the private sector in artificial intelligence and the widening availability of sensing and communications platforms, such as global positioning systems. With this proliferation of know-how, technology, and weaponry, warfare is changing. Crucially, advances in manufacturing and software have lowered the price of key equipment. A cheap commercial drone equipped with weapons, guided by another cheap drone packed with sensors, can hit specific faraway targets or conduct surveillance operations. And because they are relatively inexpensive, such aircraft can be deployed at scale. Militaries are beginning to realize that they don’t have to choose between precision and mass; they can have both.
Systems of this kind are, in military parlance, “attritable”—that is, their relatively low cost makes the loss of any one system relatively insignificant. They are inferior in comparison with the most advanced weapons deployed by the U.S. or Chinese militaries—an F-35 stealth fighter, for example, or a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile—but these systems can be deployed at a much greater scale than their more expensive counterparts. Their unit costs are low enough that their aggregate capabilities are more affordable. […]
What’s different today, as opposed to in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, is the scale at which these capabilities are employed—their undeniable mass. Both Ukraine and Russia use, and sometimes lose, thousands of drones per week for tasks including surveillance and combat. Some of these drones are recoverable, whereas others are designed for one-way missions traveling hundreds of miles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced in December 2023 that his country would produce over one million drones in 2024 and has created a separate branch of the military focused on uncrewed forces, informally known as Ukraine’s “army of drones.” […]
It is also much more expensive at present to defend against such attacks than it is to launch them. In April, Iran flung more than 300 weapons, including one-way attack drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, at Israel. With support from the United States and a handful of Middle Eastern countries, Israel repulsed almost all of the weapons. But at what cost? One report suggests the strike cost about $80 million to launch but $1 billion to defend against. A wealthy country and its allies could afford that sort of expense a few times—but maybe not 20 times, 30 times, or 100 times. Fending off this form of attack is not only expensive but also difficult. An assailant can strike at an adversary with a variety of systems; that adversary may be able to repel one specific system but struggle to deal with others. Commanders and analysts are only beginning to figure out how to counter precise mass at scale. […]
The air force is also working with the private sector to produce cruise missiles that could cost as little as $150,000 each, a fraction of the current cost of $1 million to $3 million. For its part, the navy has begun hiring specialists in robotic warfare, created a new squadron focused on uncrewed surface vessels, and experimented with large numbers of uncrewed platforms in the Middle East.
As with MRIs, so go the bombs.